Abstract: The literature on democratization emphasises how authoritarian constraints usually lead genuine opposition parties and movements to form alliances in order to make demands for reform to the authoritarian regime. There is significant empirical evidence to support this theoretical point. While this trend is partly visible in the Middle East and North Africa, such coalitions are usually short-lived and limited to a single-issue, never reaching the stage of formal and organic alliances. This paper, using the case of Morocco, explains this puzzle by focusing on the ideological and strategic differences that exist between the Islamist and the secular/liberal sectors of civil society, where genuine opposition politics occurs. In addition, this paper explains how the pro-democracy strategies of the European Union further strengthen this divide and function as an obstacle to democratic reform
Introduction
The democratization literature on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has recently begun to focus attention on the behaviour and actions of parties and movements operating under authoritarian conditions. Similar analyses were in the past conducted by using the theoretical tools of transitology, whose main assumptions were first set out in the mid-1980s in the work of Schmitter and O'Donnell, 1 and which served as a key theoretical framework to explain processes of democratization.
In addition to its academic value, some decision-makers used findings to inform their policies when 'crafting' democracy. 2 However, in recent times, many of the original findings have come under criticism in light of new theoretical contributions and empirical evidence. 3 Perhaps more importantly, many scholars now realize that 'democratization got stuck in many transition countries' 4 , requiring different theoretical approaches to analyse existing political systems.
With the controversial exceptions of Israel, Turkey and Lebanon, the MENA stands out for its relative lack of consolidated established democracies, despite various processes of ongoing liberalisation initiated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Given the persistence of authoritarianism, 5 it has become more fruitful to abandon the rigidity of the transition paradigm and concentrate on the examination of opposition dynamics without linking them to the 'teleology of transitology.' 6 As Pripstein-Posusney argues, 'there is a paucity of comparative literature on opposition strategies under pseudodemocratic conditions,' 7 where façade democratic institutions often provide cover for the unaccountability and authoritarianism of the principal decision-makers, 8 and an analysis of opposition dynamics may reveal processes that the literature on democratisation does not appear to capture. The specific focus of such studies is on cross-ideological co-operation between opposition actors. In this context, there is the theoretical expectation that under authoritarian constraints opposition groups, irrespective of their ideological positions and policy preferences, will pool their resources to try to pressurize the regime into reforming the political system because they all share the common objective of eliminating the authoritarian player to open up the political space. This is to be expected because it is only the removal of authoritarian constraints that will allow genuine opposition actors freely to put forth their visions of a new society. There is substantial empirical evidence from Eastern
European and Latin American cases to suggest that such a theoretical assumption carries considerable validity. 9 In addition, it is important to emphasise that international actors play a significant role in generating 'pooling dynamics' among opposition groups. The European Union has been traditionally very active in processes of democratization, 10 by sponsoring opposition groups in order to help them create the circumstances for political pluralism, as the more recent cases of Serbia and Georgia also demonstrate.
This article argues that in the MENA, contrary to some claims, effective unity of the opposition does not occur and it postulates that there is much more competition than cooperation among opposition groups. This is particularly true when one examines the fractious relationships between secular/liberal movements on the one side and Islamist ones on the other. The article attempts to explain why the MENA deviates from the expected behaviour of alliance-building between genuine opposition groups. The analysis concentrates on the Moroccan case and examines the divisions within the opposition not only in the context of ideological differences and tactical considerations, but also in light of the preponderant role that the EU plays in reinforcing such divisions through its direct policies of democracy promotion and its wider Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework.
While there are methodological problems in selecting only one case study, the broad similarities that exist between many countries in the region, in terms of the widespread existence of authoritarianism, the presence of similar political opposition dynamics with a dominant Islamist current and a less popular secular-liberal one and the role of the EU as an external promoter of regional policies of democracy promotion and market liberalisation might allow for useful generalisations. Morocco is a good case because of the nature of its political system, based on the controversial concept of alternance 11 implemented by the late King Hassan II. It is precisely in such contexts, where the previous exclusionary rules of participation have been relaxed in order to create a shift towards more pluralism, as attested by the inclusion of an Islamist party into the political system and the growth of autonomous social movements and civil society organisations, that we might witness the emergence of a unified opposition demanding significant and meaningful democratic institutional changes, such as the revision of the current constitution.
Theoretical discussion
Under pseudo-democratic conditions, where a degree of pluralism is introduced in the hope of re-legitimising the authoritarian system, it is logical to assume that genuine opposition actors, irrespective of their ideological and policy differences, will coalesce, if only temporarily, to put pressure on the regime to accede to their demands for more democratic change. Such an assumption is theoretically sound because opposition groups under an authoritarian regime are likely to suffer from the same constraints on their political activities and are likely to share the same desire for the authoritarian player to be removed. Thus, it seems legitimate to hypothesize that such circumstances would lead to identifying the regime as the common, principal 'enemy'. This would in turn be expected to lead to the creation of some sort of united front, electoral alliance or umbrella organisation to deal with the ruling elites and negotiate or demand, depending on their strength and resources, political reforms. The creation of a viable alternative to the regime in place is paramount because an authoritarian system can survive without much legitimacy. 12 Thus, in past transitions to democracy, such umbrella organisations were indeed created and alliance-building was a common feature. Acting as rational actors, opposition parties in authoritarian regimes for instance often form electoral alliances to unsettle the predominance of the ruling party and are at times quite successful, through this alliance, in triggering wider political reforms. 13 Thus, the pooling of resources is expected to take place because there is a common objective to be achieved and differences can be briefly set aside, as the removal of the authoritarian player is the most pressing common goal. Ideological differences and policy disputes are also momentarily set aside because if the authoritarian player remains in control such debates are of only academic interest. It follows that the assumption regarding the inevitability of coalition building among opposition groups carries considerable theoretical weight in the sense that it constitutes rational behaviour for political groups wishing to reform the existing system. 24 In Yemen, the Islamist Islah party cooperated with its secular counterparts. 25 However, alliance-building has not been deep or effective to any significant extent and it can be argued that it has been mainly of a tactical nature. This is indeed the crucial point. Alliances in MENA countries seem to be very tentative and ad hoc; opposition movements manage to build coalitions in order to put pressure on the regime on a specific issue, but the short-term nature of their accords never spills over into more wide-ranging programmes for change. This is particularly evident in the absence of a truly sustained dialogue between opposition Islamists and secular-liberal and leftist movements, whose relationships are fraught with difficulties and suspicions. Thus, rapprochements never seem to go beyond the achievement of limited results, fail to be sustained over time and are consequently generally weak. It is the absence of sustainability of these experiences that characterizes most opposition politics in the MENA and it is therefore important to explore why such coalitionbuilding dynamics fail to be effective when, under similar circumstances, other coalition-building efforts in different areas of the globe consolidated successfully. 26 If the MENA is unique in this respect, then what are the conditions of its uniqueness?
All this presents a significant academic puzzle and, at the same time, poses a challenge for domestic and international actors genuinely interested in and committed to democratic change. The absence of a significant degree of unity among opposition movements partially contributes to explaining how authoritarian regimes in the region have been able to remain in power despite the legitimacy crisis that many suffer from.
There are two, major explanations that focus on the inability of the opposition to have a more central role in the lengthy processes of democratic transition in the region, but they are mostly concerned with the capabilities of the regime rather than the deficiencies of the opposition. Firstly, as Eva Bellin argues, 'authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and North Africa because the coercive apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below.' 27 This points to the efficiency of the regimes in stifling opposition, which, weakened by constant repression, is therefore unable to make coherent demands because it is first and foremost preoccupied with its own survival.
Albrecht offers a different explanation and focuses his attention on strategies of selective co-optation, which divide opposition groups. Some opposition figures and movements are periodically integrated into the regime, but they are unable to influence policy-making decisions and are almost entirely dependent on the authoritarian leader for survival and for benefits. 28 The focus on repression and co-optation overemphasizes the material and legitimacy resources necessary for the authoritarian regimes to implement such strategies and overlooks both the strength of opposition actors and the dynamics that often characterize their relationships. It follows that the absence of coalition-building cannot solely be explained by focusing on the regimes' strengths. First of all, a number of authoritarian regimes do not possess the amount of material and legitimacy resources necessary to effectively repress and/or co-opt opposition all of the time. 29 This is evident in the regimes' attempt to recapture legitimacy through the introduction of "façade" democratic changes such as multiparty elections for legislatures that are virtually emptied of any meaningful policy-making power and autonomy. Secondly, the importance of ideology in polarized authoritarian societies should be taken into account. As hinted by Pripstein-Posusney, it is ideological disagreements that are usually to blame for the failure of both electoral and nonelectoral coalitions between opposition actors in authoritarian contexts. 30 Thirdly, in order for the co-optation of opposition groups by the ruling elites to be successful, one needs to rely on the willingness of actors to be co-opted through incentives that are greater than the positive inducements of coalition-building.
Following from the previous discussion, this article hypothesizes that coalitionbuilding does not occur because of ideological differences and tactical considerations between opposition actors, which are played out in a context where the international dimension has become a crucial variable in how domestic political and economic arrangements are put in place. 31 The opposition groups in the MENA are considerably more divided than their counterparts in other transitional countries on the type of postauthoritarian society that they would like to construct because their belief systems are often very different, sometimes simply irreconcilable. While it could be argued that such ideological and policy differences often also characterized other societies, the contention of this article is that the strength of Islamist ideological discourse and its potential, practical translation into legislation about, for example, women, minorities or religious schooling, is very much perceived to be inimical to the construction of During transitions to democracy outside the MENA, opposition parties and movements were significantly divided over issues related to the institutional set-up of the country, to the electoral system to be adopted, and to the type of economic development to be undertaken. In the MENA these issues are equally divisive, but, in A further issue to deal with is the paradox of a 'democratic discourse' that all MENA opposition groups adopt. What is striking when one examines their public pronouncements is that all opposition movements, Islamists included, utilize very similar discourses when outlining their position. For instance, in Morocco, the discourse of the Islamist Justice and Charity Group is favourable to procedural democracy 33 as the only way for the country to exit the crisis it finds itself in, just like a number of secular and liberal social movements which claim that democratic procedures and protection of human rights are the only solution to the country's ills.
Thus, there is a rhetorical consensus on democracy, human rights, justice, accountability and independence, which would indicate that they all strive for the same objectives and should, therefore, find it easy to come to an accommodation. Islamists would introduce, rolling democratic achievements back. 37 Thus, it would not make sense for secular/liberal/leftist groups to coalesce strongly with Islamists against the ruling regime because a genuine process of democratization would not benefit them, but would aid a feared competitor. In this scenario, it is also no surprise that Islamist movements in recent times expressed the wish to cooperate with the secular elements of the opposition in order to secure both acceptance and some form of democratic legitimacy. When it comes to the Islamists' strategy, they seem to consider coalition-building as a welcome development if done on their own terms, but there is no incentive to truly compromise on key issues given that they expect to win free and fair elections, which will give them the opportunity to dominate the new institutions. 38 The case of Morocco is utilized in order to analyse the validity of such a framework in explaining why effective and long-lasting coalitions do not occur in the country. In order to substantiate the hypothesis that ideology is the main variable explaining the absence of coalition-building, there should be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that ideology and references to very different belief systems are at the heart of the political discourse of the opposition actors. In addition, it should be demonstrated that references to such belief systems are not simply made in order to claim some form of legitimacy, but are a crucial part of policy formation. Finally, there should be evidence that the actions and activities of international actors, specifically the European Union, reinforce such a divide and contribute to the persistence of authoritarianism.
Opposition politics in Morocco
Morocco is today categorized as a 'liberalised autocracy', 39 where the ultimate decision-maker, the king, is unelected and unaccountable, but also where a multiparty system exists alongside a degree of individual freedoms. The system as a whole rests on the centrality of the monarchy, but political institutions and society see the activism of a number of different political movements and associations challenging the authoritarianism of the system.
Morocco has always maintained at least some façade of pluralism, 40 but under the new king, Mohammed VI, there has been a relaxation of the most authoritarian aspects of the regime and this has encouraged more openness and more participation in the political process, 41 leading to the emergence of a number of outspoken opposition actors. Looking at the institutional level, there are a number of political parties that are formally independent from the monarchy and argue for changes that would see the introduction of accountability for the principal decision-makers.
However political parties, including the Socialist Union and the Islamist Party of
Justice and Development (PJD) 42 , have largely been co-opted in so far as they have to recognise the primacy of the king if they wish to be integrated into the system. Thus, it is only by looking at the broader social level that one sees the emergence of movements dedicated to reforming radically all aspects of Moroccan politics and society. It is in the realm of civil society where the confrontational attitudes of different opposition groups are the clearest. As Michael Willis highlights, political parties in North Africa are highly discredited in the eyes of many citizens and do not perform the basic tasks that political parties should be carrying out. 43 Thus, to a significant extent, 'opposition politics' takes place within civil society and, therefore, opposition dynamics should be examined in this context. In addition, the European Union, through its policies for the region, has explicitly designed democracy promotion strategies on strengthening civil society because it believes that it is only through increased civil society activism that democratic reforms will be introduced and sustained. 44 The activism of civil society in Morocco has been examined in some detail elsewhere, 45 but it is worth reiterating here that there is a strong presence of both secular/liberal groups (among the most active organisations are women's rights groups) and Islamist ones, in particular the al-Adl led by sheikh Yassine, which is probably the largest Islamist movement in the country. 46 The level of co-operation between the two sectors of civil society is quite limited. On issues such as prisoners' rights, there is some convergence between the two camps as there is on some foreign policy matters, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Such convergence is at times explicit and takes the form of mass demonstrations as the pro-Palestinian march that took place in July 2006 in Rabat. 47 The potential for convergence on more explicitly domestic, political issues is there, 48 but it is never fully exploited and divisions tend to emerge quickly and strongly, reinforcing the separation already in existence. All alliances are temporary and focused on specific issues without spill-over effects into more comprehensive coalition-building.
The explanation for the inability and unwillingness of these groups to co-operate more fully with each other and establish a common platform of minimal demands for change is largely due to the radically different visions that they have for Morocco. 49 it is important to emphasize that the worldviews and sources of legitimacy of these two poles make it extremely complicated to have a workable synthesis along Turkish lines, which, some contend, is in a state of crisis of itself. On matters related to democracy, democratization and human rights, these two poles of reference differ quite substantially. Both ideological referents claim that a 'new', more democratic and more just Morocco can be built if the prescriptions of their respective ideologies are correctly followed. 50 Both desire radical change and wish to construct a more equitable society, where the leadership is accountable to the people. On closer inspection, the language of both is indeed similar, but the 'content' which is to constitute this 'new' country radically differs. The debate mainly centres on the role of religion in the public sphere, on which all other issues, ranging from individual freedoms to economic policy, depend for a resolution.
The focus on Sheikh Yassine's group is valid because of the dominance of the group within the Islamist camp in Morocco, particularly after the snubbing that the PJD, the main Islamist ideological rival, received from voters in the September 2007 elections. 51 The Justice and Charity Group refuses to engage in what it perceives to be a rigged political system, which does not take into account the will of Moroccans.
Judging by the low voter turnout at the September 2007 legislative elections, it could be inferred that many ordinary Moroccans share this view.
If one examines the rhetoric of Sheikh Yassine (the leader of the outlawed Islamist movement, the Justice and Charity Group), it emerges that he has nothing but contempt for the modernity the West espouses, 52 which is precisely the type of modernity that many among the secular and liberal Moroccans (such as Nourredine Saoudi, a leading civil society activist, who argues that the rise of Islamism is a danger for Morocco) 53 aspire to. In fact, according to Maddy-Weitzman, 'Yassine
[views] modernity and its globalised culture as superficial and even bestial'. 54 In particular, he rejects the notion that any political, economic and social system can be that would discuss the future of the country and the institutional choices to be made. 64 This might in theory be acceptable to other groups, but would not solve the issue of religious legitimacy to rule.
In some respects, the positions and activities of the al Adl should not be seen as The democracy promotion measures that the international community and the European Union (EU) in particular set forth are highly problematic in this context because they simply reinforce the divisions between the two sectors of civil society, rather than promoting their rapprochement. The EU implements a double strategy to promote democratization in Morocco. 71 The first pillar is trying to engage the regime in a series of reform processes that would lead it to adopt democratic changes over a number of years because of its interactions with the EU, which provides financial help to key reform sectors of the institutional and economic set up of the country. The second pillar is the fostering of civil society activism, which, building on the experience of Eastern Europe, 72 is believed to be a necessary building bloc of democracy because of its ability to make demands on the authoritarian regime from below. So far this strategy has been a comprehensive failure 73 and, paradoxically,
Morocco is probably more authoritarian today than it was five years ago. This new, authoritarian turn is partly due to international circumstances, which impacted quite significantly on Morocco with the 'arrival' on the scene of suicide terrorism, but it is also the product of the failure of the EU as a whole to put significant pressure on the regime to implement serious changes due to EU preference for securitization over normative change, which have become even more significant in the context of 'the war on terror.'
Channelling aid and funds for reform through the regime's institutions is certainly a mistake because the availability of external resources facilitates the task of blocking demands for change. However, the negative impact of the EU is much more significant at the level of civil society because of the fact that its policies are based on the perception that Islamism poses a problem rather than an opportunity. 
Conclusion
During processes of liberalization it might be expected that opposition groups, irrespective of their differences, would coalesce to achieve the one, common objective Islamists co-operated to overthrow the Shah, is a precedent that secular groups might not wish to repeat given the final outcome of the revolution.
These divisions suit the authoritarian leader, who is able to play one sector of the opposition against the other depending on the issue and is thereby able to remain the sole and unaccountable arbiter of the political system by carefully managing repression and co-optation. For the international community, this is quite a positive outcome as stability is guaranteed; for the secular, liberal opposition, a degree of influence is also guaranteed as long they ultimately rally to the regime; and for Islamists, the current situation is akin to the continuation of colonial rule by an indigenous elite, although some sectors of institutionalized Islamism benefit from cooptation.
The Moroccan case is quite paradigmatic of trends that exist elsewhere in the MENA.
Divisions within civil society remain prominent in Egypt, Jordan and Algeria, leading authoritarian regimes to successfully implement policies of 'divide and conquer'.
Through its policy instruments, the European Union provides the ideal, external support for the continuation of such divisions, leading Islamists to increasingly lose hope that the EU might be different from the United States. Civil society dynamics are an important indication of the nature of political relationships within any polity.
When it comes to the MENA, such relations are fraught with difficulties and suspicions, leaving one quite pessimistic about the possibility of civil society being a driving force for democratic transformation.
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